Egypt's constitution, article 44: Historic wrongs or
rights?
BY ZERIHUN ABEBE YIGZAW, CONTRIBUTING WRITER
Part I
Since the ousting of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has seen some
three governments either as transitional ones appointed by the
military or popularly elected in a free election.
The first transitional government of Prime Minister
Essam Sharaf was progressive and seemed to turn Egypt`s face to
Africa where its origin and life relies on. Nonetheless, it was a
transitional government and had no any constitutional ground. It was
a handicapped one and its efforts were not fruitful. But this does
not mean that Sharaf's government was unique in its orientation but
its attempts to solve the Nile issue in a peaceful and civilized way
that will establish a win-win situation was a good start.
Following a popular election in June 2012, Egypt's old
organized Islamist group-Muslim Brotherhood`s political wing Freedom
and Justice Party`s representative Dr. Mohammed Morsi won the
presidential election from Mubarak's last Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik
in a narrow vote difference (51.7 per cent to 48 per cent). The new
president established his government and appointed a water expert
Hisham Qandil as his prime minister-which shows the priority he gave
to the Nile issue. In a parliamentary election Muslim Brotherhood
with the conservative Salafists won the election and drafted a more
Islamist and criticized constitution. This indeed led to the ousting
of Mohammed Morsi in a military coup supported by a popular riot
organized by young political activists called the Tamarod in July
2013.
The
military chief of Egypt and Defence Minister appointed by Morsi
himself, General Abdel Fattah Al Sisi announced that Morsi was ousted
and the 2012 constitution suspended. Al Sisi further declared Adly
Mansour, who was the chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional
Court, as the president of the transitional government. Mansour, a
lawyer by profession, appointed Ahmed Beblawi as prime minister and
there was hope that the Nile discord would be solved as one of the
criticisms against Morsi was that he could not handle the Nile
problem well as he was busy of remarking war mongering
speeches following Ethiopia's successful re-touring
of Abbay (Blue Nile) to make clear of the river bed from water to
undertake the civil works of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD). The new government under Mansour will be in
power till a new government is established following the promulgation
of a new constitution. President Mansour was authorized to form the
constitutional drafting committee which he actually did.
Egypt's new constitution drafting body was composed of
50 people from different political groups and sectors and chaired by
Amr Moussa, ex-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt
and ex-secretary general of the Arab League. The committee was
entrusted initially to amend the constitution introduced by Mohamed
Morsi's government and was believed that it would only take sixty
days. Yet, the constitution drafting committee which almost took
three months came up with a new constitution. The new constitution is
endorsed by the people of Egypt with a 97 per cent vote in the
January 14 and 15, 2014 referendum. [...] the Egyptian people has the
right to say whatever they want in their constitution, their
politicians led them into a free fall and codified a historical wrong
that their grandfathers did in the early and mid-20th century
regarding the Nile. Let us compare the provisions of Egypt`s 2012 and
2014 constitutions on the Nile and say few words on how it is again
a historical wrong than a right.
Egypt`s 2012 constitution under Article 19 declared that
“The Nile River and water resources are a national wealth. The
State is committed to maintaining and developing them, and preventing
abuse. The use of such resources shall be regulated by law.” Hence
there is no problem and no indication is made as to the
trans-boundary nature of the river. When the constitution declares
that it is ‘national wealth’ it refers to the water that flows to
Egypt. And as any other Nile Basin country Egypt is entitled to say
the Nile is its national wealth. The provision of the 2012
constitution on the Nile is purely of domestic nature and one can say
that had no any complications. Nonetheless, it is a constitution
suspended with the ousting of Mohammed Morsi.
Article
44 of the 2014 constitution on the other hand reads as that “The
state [of Egypt] commits to protecting the Nile River, maintaining
Egypt’s historic rights thereto, rationalizing and maximizing its
benefits, not wasting its water or polluting it...” Now
the problem is on the inclusion of the phrases “maintaining Egypt’s
historic rights” which clearly shows and carries a message to the
Nile Basin states. This
made the provision under this article more controversial and, despite
a national constitution which has no legal effect outside the
Egyptian territory, the implicit meaning attached to it is worth of
scrutinizing, as it has a trans-boundary message to the Nile Basin
states. Before analysing the issue from the perspective of
international law and the politics of the Nile waters in relation to
other Nile Basin states it is worth zooming in on the meaning of
“maintaining Egypt’s historic rights” from the Egyptian
perspective.
Claim of “Historic Rights” on the Nile and
International Water Law
For Egypt the so-called “historic rights” on the
Nile are defined based on colonial or partial treaties of the 20th
century. As repeatedly discussed Egypt considers the 1929 colonial
“treaty” between Britain (on behalf of Sudan and its other
colonies in East Africa) and Egypt as the base of its “right” on
the Nile. In fact, it is difficult to call the 1929 “Agreement”
as a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Britain as the former was
still under tight political and economic control of the later. It can
better be said that the 1929 “Agreement” was between Britain and
Britain for Britain as concluded to make sure that its textile
factories in Manchester had secured uninterrupted cotton from Egypt
produced by the Nile waters. This “agreement” gave Egypt the
lion's share of the Nile waters and veto power on upstream water
projects which has been a ludicrous and irrational attempt of
controlling the Nile. In fact, the idea was that the British
administrators in upstream Nile British colonies would not do
anything without consulting the British administrators in downstream
of the Nile in Egypt. But Britain had left the Nile Basin long ago
and Egypt's current call of claiming a “right” based on an
obsolete colonial “treaty” is a self tomfoolery.
Following Sudan's independence from British colonial
rule and issues precipitated following Egypt's decision to construct
the High Aswan Dam in the 1950s, the Nile issue was again raised and
the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan was signed. In fact, the
process of negotiation for the 1959 Agreement was full of Egyptian
trickery supported by Sudan's pro-Nasser president Ibrahim Abboud who
came to power in a coup in 1958. Nonetheless, Egypt considers the
1959 Agreement as a consolidation of a self-claimed “historic
right” on the Nile. The 1959 Agreement divided the entire flow of
the Nile for Egypt, Sudan and evaporation at the Sahara from Lake
Nasser behind the Aswan High Dam (55.5, 18.5 and more than 10 billion
cubic meters of water respectively). Furthermore, the veto power of
Egypt was still maintained in this agreement. It is worth noting here
that many Sudanese are not happy with the way the 1959 Agreement is
negotiated and signed. In addition, the recent policy shift of the
Sudanese should be seen from such a perspective of latent opposition
to the unfair 1959 Agreement.
Hence for Egypt, it is those partial, unfair and
irrational “agreements” which are regarded as the basis of the
self-claimed “historic right” on the Nile. No water is left for
upstream states and their national pride was in fact insulted and
they were considered as non-existent. Their water rights were
neglected, undermined and ignored. This is what Egypt is claiming as
its “historic right” which is a total absurdity, hydro-political
arrogance and vindictive stance which will not solve the Nile
problems but throw it in a vicious-circle of mutual suspicion and
mistrust.
From upstream point of view the so-called “historic
rights”, a recurring fanfare by Egypt, are rather historic wrongs
on the Nile. Ex-British and other European colonies on the Nile,
immediately after their independence in the 1960s, declared that
agreements entered by colonial powers are null and void on newly
independent states. This is famously known as the Nyerere Doctrine
after Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who for the first time declared that
Tanganyika will not abide by a treaty entered by Britain on the Nile.
As for the 1959 Agreement it is a bilateral agreement entered between
“two independent” states where the legal effect is only on the
signatory states and as clearly declared in Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 “a treaty does not create
obligations or rights for a third party without its consent.”
As for Ethiopia, which was the only state on the Nile
Basin that was not colonized, both “agreements” are of no
concerns. In fact, Ethiopia has made its position clear in 1957
knowing that negotiation between Egypt and Sudan was taking place.
Ethiopia asserted that it has the right to utilize the Nile waters
for the benefit of its current and future generation. Furthermore, it
has unequivocally declared that any attempt of making treaties on the
Nile without involving Ethiopia has no legal effect on its
utilization of its Nile waters.
From
the above explanations one can note that the position of Nile
riparian states are at odds and Egypt is standing alone upholding an
obsolete doctrine in the utilization of trans-boundary watercourses.
In fact, other Nile riparian states have the support of international
water law which has tremendously evolved in the 20th century. In the
eyes of international law “historic right” with its other names
such as “ancient right, prior use, established right” and so on
had been nominal ‘doctrines’ in the utilization of trans-boundary
watercourses. A doctrine in this sense is defined as more of a theory
and personal opinion of a few individuals with no legal base. As far
as international water law is concerned the basic principle, which
has the acceptance of leading scholars and is accepted as a basic
rule in international courts, is the principle of equitable and
reasonable utilization. This principle is capable of answering the
water questions of any state in trans-boundary
watercourses as evidenced, for example, in the decision of the
International Court of Justice in Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case
on the Danube between Hungary and Slovakia. This principle is,
therefore, the most popular and widely accepted one and is developed
into a status of principle of customary international law. As clearly
stated in the works of leading international law experts there is
nothing called “historic right, established right, ancient right”
in international water law (For details, one can refer to A. H.
Garretson, R. D. Hayton, & C. J. Olmstead (Eds.). 1967. The law
of international drainage basins. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana.).
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